Two weeks after the redesignation of ETOUSA-COMZ as "U.S. Eisenhower, who began to shift authority from the former to the latter as the war in Europe came to a close. Army-Communications Zone (ETOUSA-COMZ)." Both SHAPE and ETOUSA-COMZ were commanded by General Dwight D. troops, were the responsibilities of the "European Theater of Operations, U.S. Operational control was exercised by the combined (US/UK) "Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF)." The administration and supply of U.S. troops in Europe were under dual command. This process has subsequently been shaped by the onset, escalation and end of the Cold War.Īt the close of World War II, U.S. European Command Press Kit, official USEUCOM web site)Īlthough the Headquarters United States European Command was formally established at "00001 Zebra hours, 1 August 1952," its activation can be seen as an evolutionary process, which actually began in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during the Second World War. The objective of this interlocking command structure is to get the fastest reaction from top to bottom in time of emergency. CINCUSEUCOM also served as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) CINCUSAFE was commander of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4th ATAF) and CINCUSAREUR served as commander of the Central Army Group (CENTAG). The "dual-hat" concept was an important factor in defining the NATO-US command structure: Each national commander also had a NATO title. Treasury and contributes markedly to the chronic deficit in this country's balance of international payments.Command Relationship: USEUCOM - SHAPE, 1968 Maintenance of a large number of American troops abroad, moreover, imposes a heavy drain on the U. Expansion of the American war effort in Southeast Asia has necessitated increases in an already vast military establishment at a time when 210,000 combat-ready forces are tied down in West Germany.
It would be doubly acceptable to the United States in view of the growing strain on this country's manpower and fiscal resources. A reduction in troop levels therefore would be more acceptable than in the past. President de Gaulle's verdict presented alliance military planners with two problems: 1) whether to replace the French forces withdrawn from the command on July 1 or accept a reduced combat readiness level and 2) the complicated task of shifting all Nato and American personnel, facilities, and material out of France by next April 1.Īt the root of the current discussion of American force levels in Europe is the belief-held widely in Europe and the United States-that there is little likelihood at present of a Soviet attack in the West. The review was triggered by France's decision, announced in March 1966, to withdraw from the integrated military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The new look at the rationale behind heavy commitment of American forces in Europe results from a combination of developments. They cast doubt on the wisdom of relying on a 20-year-old policy in the face of drastically changed conditions. But in recent months this tenet has come under increased attack from congressional and other skeptics. Maintenance of a large number of American troops in Europe has been virtually an article of faith for United States policy makers since emergence of the Soviet threat after World War II.
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